Cliff Prince, Dba Prince Construction Company v. R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc v. Western Surety Company, Inc. v. Genevieve A. Prince : Brief of Appellant R. C. Tolman Construction Company by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Cliff Prince, Dba Prince Construction Company v.
R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc v.
Western Surety Company, Inc. v. Genevieve A.
Prince : Brief of Appellant R. C. Tolman
Construction Company
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Dennis L. Draney; Attorney for RespondentRobert M. McRae;
Attorneys for Appellants
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Prince Construction v. Tolman Construction, No. 16220 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1576
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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INDI:X 
S'll\'['J:'!LUT OF 'fliE CASr: 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUCIIT !3Y THIS l1PPEAL 
ST,\TI.:MT::lJT JF ['ACTS 
i'\R(;W1ENT 
POINT I: THE COUHT ERRED IN THE WAY IT 
APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF QUANTU/.I MERUIT 
TO THE FACT SITUATION. 
POitlT II: THE COURT IN ITS CALCULATION 
J1PPLIED QUANTU!I MERUIT TO CREDIT TOU1AN 
FOR WORK ACTUALLY DONE BUT FAILED TO 
, l1PPLY QUANTUM MERUIT TO THE REllAINING 
BALl\NCE OF $13,386.34. 
POINT III. THE COURT IN FINDING THE 
CONTRACT DIVISIBLE SHOULD HAVE AWARDED 
THE EXCESS AMOUNT OF THE SUBCONTRACT 
l\GREEMEtlT LESS APPROPRIATE PAYllENTS TO 
TflOS E WHO DID THE WORK TO TOLMAN WHO 
11CTUALLY PERFORllED THE WORK OF THE 
THR[;E CONTRACT ITE11S \IHI Cl! 1\CTUALLY 
CREATED THE EXCESS Al!OUtlT. 
Sut!l!J,RY 
Authority Cited 
LUYIC v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d 418 (1961) 
Miller v. Youn9, 197 Old. 503, 172 P.2d 994 ( ) 
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ST~TENENT OF THE CASE 
The facts of the case are basically set forth in the 
11ndJngs of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the court 
(R-lc,1 throuc_rh R-l':i4). R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc., 
dcc[cndant and appellant, and hereinafter callecJ "Tolman" was 
awarclcd a contract for construction of roads and other facilities 
for lhl' United States Forest Service near Fishlake. Tolman 
subsequently, by a written subcontract agreement subcontracted 
(R-49 through 52, R-84 through 87) eleven specific bid iter.1s 
of work to Prince Construction Company, plaintiff and respondent, 
' c:md hereinafter called "Prince." Prince performed part of the 
subcontract items but by late summer or early fall of 1973 
Prince had not performed three of the contract items. Tolman 
Look over these contract items and completed the work. It was 
not until sometime later after the contract work had been 
completed that the parties became aware of a problem with payment 
under the contract ancJ a dispute arose. 
There are several matters which are not distJuted. First, 
there is no dispute t11at the subcontract agreement is the 
c1ocur:1cnt governing the relationship between the parties. 
Seccrndly, the court found that Tolman gave actual notice of 
taking over the work from Prince. There is also no question 
that Tolman, in fact, took over the work and it was Tolman who 
completed each of the three remaining contract items. The court 
was called on to determine the proper measure and method of 
:orupensation to both parties. The court applied the doctrine of 
1. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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quantum merui t in arriving at th c amount;; to be' ilWC\ rJcJ c etch 
party. TEe detail of the courts award ol compensation will 
be detailed hereinafter. Bas_i_call~', the ccrnrt delerioined 
the value of the three subcontract items since those ilre the 
ones in dispute and subtracted from the subcontract net value 
the cost of Tolman's work to complete the work along with some 
offsets and awarded the remaining balance of $18,386.34 to 
Prince (R-156). 
It is from the procedure used by the court in applying 
the ·:l(',:''-rine of quantum meruit to the fact situation that 
The facts show that Tolman had an unbalanced 
bid for the three contract items in question in that Tolman 
had misunderstood the contract and entered a bid in excess of 
its costs to do the work. Appellant contends that the three 
contract items generated the excess fund for the amount of the 
judgment so that when the court applied its version of quantum 
meruit the court simply credited Tolman for the cost of the work 
done to complete the subcontract agreement and gave the remainim 
value of $18,386.24 to Prince by way of Judgment. Tolman 
contends that the excess amount of $18,386.34 in the three 
contract items should have been awarded by the court to Tolman 
instead of to Prince. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter came before the court for trial in two parts. 
The first trial before the court was on the issue of liability. 
The issue of damage Wils heard Liy the cou1t some months later. 
The court entered its Findings of Fact cinJ Conclusions of Law 
2. 
-
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Uuve111!Jer JO, l'J78. 
$18, l8G.34. 
The court awarded Prince the sum of 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY TIIIS APPEAL 
Toln~n asks this court to either reverse the judgment 
of the District Court and award the $18,386.34 to Tolman or 
to rcnand the case back to the District Court with instructions 
that the court is to correctly apply quantum meruit such that 
the z111ard of $18, 386. 34 be made to Tolman who performed the 
work on the three remaining contract items and not to Prince 
who did not do the work on the three remaining contract items. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prince and Tolman entered into a subcontract agreement 
dated October 7, 1972 relating to certain road building and 
related construction work connected with a contract Tolman 
received from the Forest Service titled United States Forest 
Service Fish Lake Sanitation Project. (Rl51). Prince started 
work in the fall of 1972 on the $73, 521. 48 subcontract which 
l1ad 'JO calendar days for completion on eleven separate bid items. 
(R49 through 52, R84 through 87) (Exhibit A). Prince worked 
for eleven days during 1972 (tr page 14 line 5) and returned to 
the project in July of 1973 (tr page 15 line 19). Prince 
testified that there were three contract items he could not do 
in July of 1973 to wit: 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2 (tr page 
25 line 2224). Prince continued to work on the other 7 items 
of worl:. The final i tern was for crushecl aggregate and could not 
t'" clone, until ite::is 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2 the hauling and 
1 ,-,_1 !\, 1 lJorr 1 JVJ \Vas done. Prince did not have the equipment to 
d,1 t 11·, three i terns and was arranCJing with a 11r. Wirthlin to do 
3. 
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the remainin<J work. (tr p. 28-30). \Vlwn tile_· tirc1e hacJ LJO!le 
past the 90 days set forth in the contract sorncLime in 
October, Tolman told Prince he woulcJ do tlle !Jorrow, tne 
overhaul and the second overlE1ul on items 2222-1, 2230-1 
and 2230-2. (tr 25 line 26 etc.) Tolman tllereilfter did all 
of the 11ork on the items listed above (tr 37 line 29 to i-'aLJe 
38 line 11) (tr 39 line 27 etc.) (tr 40 line 1-6 etc.). 
Thereafter, Prince was paid for the work he completed on seven 
of the items but was not paid on the three items listed of 
2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2 because Tolman did that work along 
with _s:._,1 Prince was paid $48,160.19 by Tolman 
(tr page 4L line 18-22). A dispute arose between the parties 
as to how such Prince should be paid and a settlement of diffe~ 
ences attempted (tr p. 43). Subsequent to the disµute arising 
Prince testified that he expected the total subcontract price 
for the overhaul and borrow items even though he didn't physic~ 
do the work and he was asking for the full bid price based on 
the contract. (tr 45 line 16-28). When Prince was asked about 
the provisions in the contract that any assignments of portions 
the work had to be approved by Tolman, Prince said that he 
knew that and Wirthlin knew it and the change was never reques~ 
or permission to subcontract to anyone else given (tr 82 etc.). 
It was also clear that without subcontractin0 the work to somern 
else, Prince had no capability to complete items 2222-1, 2230-1 
and 2230-2. (tr 82 etc.). The most Prince had was a "verbal 
agreement" subsequently denied by Tolman that he had "subcontrac 
the three i terns back to Tolman. (tr p. 'H) . 'I' lie tes tirc1ony was 
clear that Prince never told ·1·/irthlin to come and do tne work 
on the three items (tr 102 line 27-30 [>. 103 line 1-12). 
4. 
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Tolrnan tl1en testified that he did items 2222-1, the 
1uad barrow; 2230-J, the roadway haub and 2230-2, the roadway 
IL-iul·, zrncl contractec1 to a third party item 2240-1, the crushed 
:t']']recpte (tr 134,135,). Tolman told Prince in "the latter 
l'·1rt of September th:1t he 1wuld have to step in and do these 
things," meaning the 3 above listed i terns (tr 136 line 18-30, 
page 137 line 1 to 5) but gave the notice verbally and not in 
1;riting. At the time the verbal notice was given, Prince 
continued doing other things and Tolman completed the three 
i terns. (tr 142 - etc.) Tolman stated his reason for pressing 
. 
Prince to complete the work and ultimately to take over the 
work was pressure from the Forest Service Engineer. (tr 142-
1 inc 2G) Tolman testified the work for 2222-1, 2230-1 and 
2230-2 was scheduled to be done by June of 1973. (tr 162 
line 4 - line 23) so that the asphalt could be in place in 1973. 
(tr 1G2 line 24-30 Tolman testified that there was some 
urgency to put the asphalt on because of the fuel shortage and 
scarcity of petroleum products (tr 1G3 line 1-16). The engineer 
informed him he as lagging and he went to Prince to see if the 
work could be hurried along (tr 164). Thereafter Prince did no 
work on the three items (tr 165). Tolman had no agreement with 
Prince to do Prince's haul work (tr 168 line 18-23). The work 
~ook four weeks (tr 169 line 9) and the asphalt was not placed 
in 1973 (tr 169 line 16-24). So that the work scheduled for 
1973 went through the winter to be completed in 1974. Prince 
•.vas invited to return to the job in 1974 to complete his items 
;,1,1- '1111 not retun1 (tr 169,170) .. The court stated after the 
5. 
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testimony that "with regard to plaintiff':c; clciir,1, that he 
entered into a subcontract with Mr. Tolrncin to haul what has 
been referred to as borrow, the court would fi11Ll that claim 
is not supported by the evidence. Mr. Prince, the court 
understctnds your testimony was that you were enterinCj into a 
subcontract for Mr. Tolr:ian to haul this mciterial. .. but the 
court cannot find that to be a contract, because your evidence 
does not support the requirements of a contract, which would 
be a meeting of the minds or evidence that Mr. Tolman also 
understood that to be the contract. When an attempt is made 
to ~~c~. the terms of a written contract by an oral contract, 
there is a substantial burden placed upon the party makiny the 
claim of an oral contract. This court cannot find that the 
parties made that agreement. The court would find that Mr. 
Tolman did in fact take over the hauling and will find that 
he gave no written notice as provided by the contract. This 
leaves Mr. Tolman somewhat vulnerable as to his position ... 
\tr 189 line 18-30, 190 line 1-7). 
The court went on in TR 190 to find there was evidence to 
support an agreement for Tolman to do the hauling and that no 
time restrictions were violated such that there would l.Je a 
breach of contract. (tr 191). 
The court found no evidence of manipulation on the part 
of Mr. Tolman to get out of a part of the contract where he saw 
a loss and hold onto the part where he wds a gain (TR 192 line 
2-6). The court very importantly found the contract to l.Je 
divisible (TR 192 line 7-8). The court found that "the form 
6. 
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i tcn1s were taken over l~y Mr. Tolman and he is entitled to 
~ayment for taking over these items. And, at this point, the 
court is inclined to feel that it should be on the basis of 
quantum mcruit (TP 192-11-14). The court also found that 
Prince had actual notice from Tolman that the work would be 
taken over. (Tr 192 line 26-30). 
With the evidence as to liability before the court and 
the court committed to the concept of quantum meruit, the trial 
uroceeded to the second phase of damages wherein the court 
found that Tolman had received payments of the three items as 
follows: 
a. Item No. 2222-1 Barrow Road 
b. Item No. 2230-1 Overhaul Road 
c. Item No. 2230-2 Overhaul Road 
Total Paid 
Less adjustr.ients for additional 
work over and above the contract 
amount 
Net Payment on three items 
The court then allowed offsets for the 
cost of work done on the three items by 
Tolman of 
Sub Balance 
and the court allowed other adjustments 
and offsets of: 
Final Dalance 
$13, 630. 00 
20,454.00 
17,965.00 
$52,049.00 
15,269.00 
$39,586.00 
15,269.67 
$24,316.33 
5,929.99 
nH,386.34 
Tfh SUJ, 386. 34 which represents payment of the subcontract 
to ·1·011,un by thc Forest Service less the cost of Tolman' s 
11ork and other offsets left a balance which the court awarded 
7. 
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the three items which generated tile 1:unJ ''i monc~· tJ]c: jud,Jment 
ultimately was taken from. 
ARCurn:tJT 
POINT I 
Tl!E COURT ERRED IN THE \'11W IT APPLIED THE DOC1'!UiH.: OF 
QUANTliM MERUIT TO THE FACT SITU11'1'IO'..J. 
The subcontract sets forth the basic quantum meruit 
doctrine in paragraph 2. It is important that the court follow 
the subcontract provisions or the well estalilislled rules which 
surround the concept of quantum meruit. 
p, ,.,\graph 2 of the subcontract agreement desiyna teu as 
"Frc_,,; -, .. cc:n .J£' Work, Delays, Commencement and Completion of 
Work, c~c." clearly sets for the circumstances whereby the 
contractor may take back the work and what the compensation to 
the contractor will be as follows: 
"any costs incurred by the contractor in doing 
any portion of the work ... shall be charged against 
any monies due under the terms of this agreement, and 
in the event the total amount due or to become due 
under the terms of this agreement shall be insufficient 
to cover the costs accrued by the contractor in completing 
the work, then the subcontractor ... shall be ... liable 
unto the contractor for the; difference." 
Appellant submits that the contract provision is nothing 
more than a restatement of the gc;neral principles of contract 
law in such a situation. Appellant also sulimits that tne court 
folloHed the provisions of paragi:apl1 2 in that it qave Tolman 
credit for the actual cost of the work done. But, appellant 
submits most strongly that the court failed to correctly apply 
the doctrine of quantum merui t tu the: [1ottion of the subcontract 
agreement which represented the excesc; arfJU!lt of money after 
Tolman was paid for the 1mrJ; lie , Ii r]. 'l'hc c'xcos~:; .:1mount \Vas 
i:l. 
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l_,r~cous 1_: uf an error in bir1c1ing which gave Tolman more money 
tl1cin it c0st to do the work. The court was correct in giving 
'I'r:ilmon credit for the actual work he did, but erred when it 
~\;cirdcd \·1hat amounts to a valance of the subcontract price 
un the three items to Prince. 
:~'-'statement of the Law of Contracts, Section 246: Corbin 
on Contracts, Section 1089 says with emphasis added, states: 
"When a contractor [Prince in this case) fails 
to perform a construction contract, the owner [Tolman 
in this case) is entitled to complete the work or 
have it completed by a third party. The contractor 
[Prince] is then liable for the costs incurred in 
such completion decreased by the amount of the contract 
price for the work which the owner [Tolman) then does 
n.ot have to pay the contractor. 
Implicit in both the restatement and the subcontract 
provision is the concept that if the contract costs more to 
complete than was bid, the subcontractor must pay for the 
difference. However, our situation is unusual because the 
subcontract, after paying Tolman for the work done, still has 
$l(J,386.34 which is in excess of the work Tolman did, plus 
otli·=:r adjustments. Counsel submits that the law is that when 
the v;orl: is taken back and actually done by the contractor 
that the one who does the work is entitled to what value is 
rcm0ininq in the subcontract. 
Tl1ere is no question that Prince did any of the work so 
Ll1c' calc11la tions under the subcontract provision and the 
rcc:i:atcrC1ent are very simple to calculate. There is simply no 
crl'clit <Jiven to Prince for the work since he didn't do any. All 
, r i he cost c;hould go to 'l'olman. That is what happened in this 
,. ·'" ·i•t L11:it tie court did not address itself to the remaining 
I_, I ~.i 1·.'hi ch ls left in the subcontract. The court erred 
9. 
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in awarding the balance of the subcontract which did nut 
represent work done to Prince. The court should huvc awarded th: 
$18,386.34 which represents r<.0maininCJ money in the subcontract 
because of an unbalanced bid to Tolman. 
In Judye Swan's order entL'red at Pl2), the court says, 
"The court outlines the Findings of Fact and further finds 
that the four items were taken over by Mr. Tolman and he is 
entitled to payment for taking over those items. i\t this 
point the court is inclined to feel that it should be on a 
quantur.i meruit basis." Appellant agrees that by applying quantu: 
mcrcit, the court is correctly following the intent of the 
Restatement of Law and the subcontract provision of the 
subcontract agreement. Appellant agrees that the court did, in 
fact, apply quantum meruit to the point of crediting Tolman 
for the work he did. However, appellant disagrees with the court 
in awarding the balance remaining in the subcontract to Prince 
because that conclusion does not follow if the court had 
properl~ applied the doctrine of quantum meruit. Had the court 
applied quantum meruit as it indicated in the transcript and the 
rules the court would have awarded the remainder of the money 
in the subcontract agreement to To1man. 
The following agreement is inssupport of the concept that 
the Judge should have awarded the remaining monies in the 
contract to Tolman. Language from the Oklahoma Suprc=me Court 
summarizes this situation very well: 
"It is an elementary princi plc of the law of concepts 
that in order to recover upon 0 contract, the contractor ... 
must first establish his own performance or u valid excuse 
for his failure to i)erfon.l. Since• plzu11tiff failed ... 
to complete tlw work hc cuntraclcd to do, without vaUd 
excuse for such failure, he wa~; ent.itled to no JUclgment 
against defendant. "!ii_l_~cr· v._ -~'2_u_1_1_'J, l'J i Okl. SO_;, 
l 72 p. 2d 994. 995 ( ) . 
10. 
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'l'i1 it lci1tC)ua0e \·1a:; quoted with approval as the law in this State 
111 LOW-'::'.__ v. Rosenl~f, 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 p.2d 418 (1961). 
"1\ pa1-Ly gerierully cannot rec ver without showing 
full performance ot his part [of the contract]. 
~ny right of recovery as a result of part performance 
is on il quuntum meruit. ['J'here may be recovery] where 
only part )Jerformance has been rendered if such partial 
performance was accepted by, or was of benefit to the 
other part:; "Ardoin v. Royden" S.W. 2d (Tex. Civ. 
1.pp. 1959); Lowe v. Rosenlof, Supra. 
Prince cannot show performance for anv of the $18,386.34. 
Ti:·~· court has ruled that Tolman took over the work and completed 
iL. Under the doctrine of quantum meruit there is no justification 
£01_- Pril!ce to receive any more for the work he did than what he 
rE'cciyed. He did none of the work, therefore, he should have 
riceived no money for that work done by Tolman. 
Certainly there is no prejudice to Prince if he receives 
quantum meruit for what he did. There is no question that Prince 
was paid for what he did. He received over $48,000 for work done. 
The question is who gets the remaining $18,386.34 in the contract. 
Prince was paid for what he did and Tolman was paid for what he 
did and because of the unbalanced nature of the bid, there is s 
still $18,386.34 remaining. By rules of quantum meruit, appellant 
s 1,bmi ts the court erred because Prince did nothing by way of 
perfori:1i1nce to warrant any award to him of any more than what 
Jw di c1 _ Dy requiring Tolman to show what work was required to 
c.ir.1plelc the contract and reducing the amount in the subcontract 
b; that amount is simply the reverse of having Prince show what 
he did and reducing it for the subcontract amount the amount of 
18,38G.34 v10uld remain. 
11. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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It should be remembered tllut quu11luin rnci u1 t wllich 1.S the 
doctrine of the court applied, io; not a cont r<1·_·Luill cluctrirw 
but an equitable doctrine desi')ned to equi tiibl '/ dnc! iui rly 
achieve a balanced result in o c3se. ll\ 011 ; 
applying the doctrine of quantunr meriut, tlic court has 0chievecl 
a result that is unfair and unjust to Tol mun v1hu did lhe work 
and unjustly enriching to Prince who under the jucigme11t, will 
be paid for what he did but did not do. 
The quantum meruit basis of recovery is equitable in natun 
and is not predicated on the contruct. 
r such circumstances, where benefits have 
cic·~c·ucJ to the owner by reason of material 
furn;.shed or labor performed by the contractor, 
eq.:it:.· 1·1ill sometimes require the owner to account 
for the reasonable value of the benefits received, 
not because the contractor who has breuched his 
contract has any right to rely thereon, but because 
it would be inequitable for the owner to receive 
and retain something for nothing at the expense of the 
contractor. United States Pipe & Foundary Co. v. 
City of Waco, 100 S.W. 2d 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). 
Thus, plaintiff must show it would be ineyui table for Tolma 
to retain the benefits, if any, from the four items in question 
before plaintiff can recover on quantum meruit. Some courts have 
said that plaintiff must show unjust enrichment of defendant 
before a quantum meruit recovery will be allowed. Nelson v. 
Hazel, 433 p.2d 120 (IC:. 196-/). 
Prince contends that he should be paid ut the contract 
price for the four items in question. Tolmon submits thut under 
the rules of law discussed above, such payr~nt would nut be 
proper. Prince did not earn payrnent at the contract µrice by 
full performance of the items nr,r di cl he l c:t iiJlish <l valid excuse 
12. 
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for his failure to perform. His muximum recovery on those 
ilcms is thus limited to quantum meruit. Since Prince did 
nothing on the contract items pluintiff would not be paid 
tor those items. 
Tolmun submlts that the case should be remanded back t6 the 
c·ourt to apply the doctrine of quantum meruit fairly for both 
purties. The court only partially applied the doctrine relying 
on a mixture of adherence to the contract yet applying an 
equitsale doctrine of quantum meruit. 
Except for the extra $18,386.34 which neither party did 
any work tp receive, the court applied the doctrine of quantum 
meruit. However, it is unjust and unfair to award the 
$18,3BG.34 to Prince simply because the money was the remainder 
after Tolman was paid for his work. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IN ITS CALCULATIONS ,'\PPLIED QUAN'l'UM MERUIT 
TO CREDIT TOLMAN FOR WORK ACTUALLY DONE BUT FAILED 
TO APPLY QUMJ'rU/.1 MERUIT TO THE REMAINING BALANCE OF 
$18,386.34. 
If the findings of fact are not disputed so that there 
ure notquestions of fact remaining, it is obvious that the 
court's logic in applying quantum merui t is exactly reversed from 
what should have been. The court had Tolman calculate the 
vuluc of what he did on the subcontract, but did not require 
PLince to do the same thing. Had the court_required Prince to 
calculate what he did on the project, the court could have then 
easily calculated which party receives what part of the contract. 
Tf the court paid Tolman for what he did and if the court paid 
1 i 11 ~· f." 11!1, L lie ilicl the court would still have roughly $18, 000 
L; 1 t in t:J1L' ..__·, 111 t r,-1ct 
13. 
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to distribute. 
of quo.ntum merui t since Prince did not con1p I c>tt_' th1c work nor 
perform on the items of work th<"n ~he courL \;uuld have LJ.warded ti 
$18,000 to Tolman because he is the ori<Jlllctl c 1 l11tracLor. 
\~hen Prince did not do the work the subcontr:ict wac: t<lkc>n over 
by Tolman and Prince was paid for whLJ.t he did. 
It is interesting to note how consistent the numbers would 
be if the court had reversed the situation so that the proof of 
the numbers would be on Prince. The contract price roughly 
$87,000 with no adjustments. Prince was paid roughly $48,000 
($87,000 less $48,000 = $39,000) 
Then yo--' reduce theamount Tolman got credit for of roughly 
$15,000 for the work done on the three contract items. 
($39,000 less $14,000 = $24,000) Then reduce again by the 
roughly $6,000 Tolman got credit for in the offsets for work 
the next year in 1974, etc. ($24,000 less $6,00U = $1~,000) 
The $18,000 roughly corresponds to the Jud0ment amount of 
$18,386.34 which the court awarded to Prince bacause it was what 
was left in the subcontract agreement. 
What this shows is that either way the court applies 
quantum meruit to pay both the parties their share of work 
actually Cduses around $18,000 to remain in the subcontract 
agreement. Appellant submits that it is clear that the $18,000 
is simply an excess amount after deducting for work actually 
done by both parties and the balance of $18,000 would rouyhly 
remain in the subcontract agreement using either approach. 
14. 
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TlFJS the real questi,-=m is once of which party should get 
the excess $18,000. 
POINT III 
Tl!E COURT IlJ I'IllDING THE CONTRACT DIVISIBLE SHOULD 
Hl\VI: AWARDED TllE EXCESS AMOUNT OF THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT 
LESS APPROPRIATE PAYMENTS TO THOSE WHO DID THE WORK TO TOLMAN 
\'ii10 ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE WORK OF THE THREE CONTRACT ITEMS 
l/ll!ICH l\CTUALLY CREATED THE EXCESS AMOUNT. 
The court found that the "items of the subcontract 
agreement were divisible." This is important because of the 
area in which the $18,38G.34 judgment comes from. The court 
found that Tolman took over the work on three specific items 
and was paid by the Forest Service with adjustments for addi-
tional work the sum of $39,000.00 as follows: 
a. Item No. 2222-1 Borrow Road $13.630.00 
b. Item No. 2230-1 Overhaul Road 20,454.00 
c. I tern No. 2230-2 Overhaul Road 17,965.00 
Total Paid $52,049.00 
Less adjustments for additional 
work 15,269.00 
Net Paid $39,586.00 
The court then allowed ottsets for the cost of work 
clone and some other adjustments as follows: 
Net paid on three itccms $39,586.00 
Less cost of work done by Tolman 15,269.67 
$24,316.33 
Less Offsets 5,929.99 
Total Judgment $18,386.34 
15. 
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The judgment is basically the amol1'1t of 1,1ont?y lc:ft in 
the contract after both parties ho.ve been pciicl for the work 
that they did. The court is then left with o. j ucJc;1llcnt for 
$18, 386.34 which simply is the excess of the contract price 
over the cost of the work. 
It is important that the contract is divisible beco.use 
the basic fund of money that caused the surplus in the first 
place arises from the three items of work which Tolman took 
over and performed. If quantum meruit is applied or if the 
contract lL 'i.c;i.on number 2 is applied, the surplus amount 
of $18,386.34 should go to Tolman. 
It could be argued that the subcontract which is the 
subject of this action called for Prince, the subcontractor, to: 
eleven items of the work required by the prime contract between 
defendant, the prime contractor, and the forest service. The 
amount of compensation which Prince was to recei vc for each of 
those items was separately stated in the subcontract. Because 
that compensation was so stated item by item, the contract betweE 
the parties was, as the Court found, divisible in no.ture. 
This divisible contract is, in effect, several separate 
contracts between the parties which may be independently completi 
and paid for. Prince is entitled to payment o.t the contract 
price for the items of the divisible contrctct which he completed 
and any breach or dispute concerning the other items does not 
affect that right to payment. On all items on whicll there is a 
dispute or breach of the contract, however, the norf'.1al rules of 
contract law apply to measure the dama(_JCS for the' Lreach and to 
deterraine which party is rC'spon'oiJ,1 e for L] 1o:;c cL:1ma~1es. 
lG. 
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The court found that defendant, Tolman, took over the 
three items stated above of the items in the contract because 
Prince had not performed on those items. The court also found 
thut Prince had actual notice that Tolman was going to take over 
those items as Tolman was allowed to do by paragraph 2 of the 
contruct. Prince made no protest or objection to the take over 
by Tolman of those items. 
Because the contract is divisible, Prince is entitled to 
recover the contract price on the items which he completed. 
The maximum which he can recover on the other items is to be 
determined on the basis of quantum meruit. That is the rule 
which fits the situation in this case. Each of the separate 
. 
items is treated, in effect, as an entire contract an on each 
of the items: 
Since the amount saved by Tolman by not having to pay 
Prince to co~plete them, Tolman is not entitled to recover 
any damages from Prince on those items. 
On the other hand, since Prince did not complete the 
items in question, he is not entitled to recover the contract 
price from Tolman. Restatement, Section 246(b). 
Prince may argue that Tolman is not entitled to proceed 
as under paragraph 2 because the five days written notice 
referred to in that paragraph was not provided. The court found, 
however, that Prince had actual notice of Tolman's intent to 
take over the four items. Prince would have been no better off 
us far as remedying the breach of the contract is concerned had 
the written notice been given. Because of the actual notice, 
Prince was in no way damaged by the lack of the written notice. 
17. 
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It is quite cle.:ir that the langu.:ir1e cjllOtccl LlUOVC f1·om 
paragraph 2 of the contract uctween the J'd' ttcs dews not ollow 
Prince to recover the contro.ct price for the items wliicli were 
done by Tolman. That laIHJuacic provides tiw t Prince is liaule 
for the costs incurred by Tolman in comµlcti11y tile four items 
and that Tolman could charge those co.3ts aciainst monies "due or 
to become due" to Prince under the contract. In other words, 
Tolman could, if necessary, charge the costs of comµletion aga1. 
mci-. ._ ,. "-::;_ch were to be paid to Prince for his cornµletion of th 
ot:1e~· _;_t~ms covered by the subcontract agreement. Howhere does 
the contract, nor any principle of contract law, provide that 
Prince is to be paid for the items completed by Tolman. The 
payments for the four items done by Tolman never became due to 
Prince because Prince did not do the work and earn the payment. 
The divisible nature of the contract µlaces the emµhasis 
of what work was done in proper perspective uecause each item 
can be calculated as a single entity whicl1 the court did not & 
Had it looked to those areas where the surJlus money existed tt 
create the judgment it would have realized that it was in the 
items of work done by Tolman and would have correctly aµplied 
the laws of quantum meruit. 
The court did find that frince relied on a conversation 
between Prince and Tolman wherein Prince felt that Tolman wou~ 
do the hauling. The subcontract agreement does not provide for 
such changes and without a writing as required there can be no 
actual agreement but the court found no breach of contract on 
either plaintiff or defen1ic1nt' ,; 1'·11 1- Tlw nel iCincc on the 
conversation apparently kept Prjnce t1un1 brcc1ching tile contrac: 
but does not set up an actual chan<Je in U1r_• sul.Jcontract ayreemi 
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which the court fournJ defendant took over pursuant to 
paragraph 2 with actual notice. Defendant did not protest the 
take over. It is important to note that Prince under provisions 
of the subcontract agreement cannot assign or subcontract any 
part of his subcontract without approval of the defendant. No 
part of the subcontract agreement was ever assigned or subcon-
tracted as there is no document or evidence to show that it was. 
Defendant submits that the evidence clearly shows that 
Defendant did the hauling work covered in the three contract 
items. Secondly, the evidence is clear that plaintiff did not 
do the hauling work and would be unjustly enriched if it were 
paid for something it did not do. Thirdly, the court found 
that defendant gave actual notice and the items were taken 
back by the defendant. Fourth, the court found that there was 
no subcontract agreement between Prince and Tolman but did find 
that Prince relied on a conversation he had with Tolman which 
Tolman does not remember which keeps Prince from breaching 
his contract. The law is clear as to how the damages in such 
a situation are to be handled which law is merely a restatement 
of the subcontract agreement which gives Tolman the payment for 
the contract and if the expense of the work exceeds the amount 
of the contract price, Prince would be responsible for the excess 
of expense over contract price. In this case the expense of 
the work did not exceed the contract price and both the law and 
the subcontract agreement would pay the contract price to the 
one who clid the work, namely, the defendant, Tolman. 
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SUMili\HY 
The evidence is not in qucsLion. lt LS clear tli.:it no 
matter how one views the evidence the s.:ime bao;i c Licts appear 
as follows: 
l. Tolman had a contract with the F,Jrcst Service• which 
he subcontracted to Prince. 
2. Prince did part of the subcontract, but Tolman yave 
actual notice to Prince that Tolman would complete the contract, 
3. It is not relevant to the Doctrine of qu.:intum w::ruit 
•.-;ha::. , ·,·~c_.,,,:::e::: \Jere had or what agreements were made. It is 
simply iraportant who does the work and who performs the effort, 
,l. Both the contract document and the Restatement are 
quantum meruit doctrines and the court attempted to apply 
quantum meruit. 
5. The contract is divisible in nature and because it 
is divesible in nature the court should have looked to what 
factors created the fund for the judgment award. In this case 
the court obviously added up the three contract i terns to deterrni· 
the available monies and then subtracted out appropriate 
adjustments. 
G. If the court had correctly applied quantum meruit and 
given proper recognition to where the money of the j udyment carne 
from the court would have recognized that it basically came fror. 
three items of work which were done by Tolman and were not done 
by Prince. 
7 · Prince is not prejudiced in any way not to receive 
the $18, 38G. 34 because lie did nut Ju llic vmrk in the three 
contract items which created tllc 1110 1v:y frcH, 1 ivliicil the JUdqment 
came. 
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U. Tolmcin is prejudiced bec.:iuse he tqok over the three 
i tem!c; of work which were all that needed to be completed and 
sor,11, L~ted those three i terns and it was from those three i terns 
that the mone~' for the judgment comes from and yet he gets 
nonL of the money even though he did the work. 
9. It is clear that the $18,386.34 is an excess of 
subcontract price less the payments to the parties who did the 
work. If Tolmcin is paid what work he did and if Prince is 
paid what work he did there is still $13,386.00 or so left 
to be awarded by the court. 
Appellant submits that because Tolman did 
the work the $18,386.34 should be awarded to Tolman. If the 
doctrine of quantum meruit had been followed by the court, the 
court would have awarded the $18,386.34 to the party who actually 
performed the work which party would have been Tolman. 
Appellant prays that the court reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and award the $10,386.34 to Tolman 
::ir rc1,1and the c.:ise back to the District Court with instructions 
pursucint to the doctrine of quantum meruit to award the $18,386.3~ 
to Tolmun. 
nespectfully submitted this ?CU. day of July, 1979. 
~~or 
Appellant, R. C. Tolman 
Construction Company, Inc. 
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